This is the third (and last) post in a series (first post here, second here) about ROPC, describing implementation of its features like tables, conditional jumps, recursive calls, etc. Please familiarize yourself with the two first posts, otherwise this one might be hard to follow.
This is the second post in a series (first post here) describing ROPC. Programs accepted by the compiler are written in ROPL (Return Oriented Programming Language). ROP programs are usually used as stage 0 payloads. They compute addresses, change memory protections, call few OS APIs. For this reason, language expressing them doesn’t have to be complex.
This is a long overdue post describing ROPC (Return Oriented Programming Compiler, available here: https://github.com/pakt/ropc) with its own “higher level” language and features like conditional jumps, loops, functions (even recursive ones), tables, etc.. ROPC was released in 2012. Since then, Christian Heitman made a fork  capable of compiling ROP programs expressed in C (!).
The birthday problem  asks what’s the probability that among people at least two of them have the same birthday. The “paradox” is that the answer is counterintuitive — in a group of 23, the probability is close to 50%.
Code Virtualizer is a software protection solution using heavy obfuscation. Citing the author’s website :
Code Virtualizer is a powerful code-obfuscation system that helps developers protect their sensitive code areas against Reverse Engineering while requiring minimum system resources.
Code Virtualizer can generate multiple types of virtual machines with a different instruction set for each one. This means that a specific block of Intel x86 instructions can be converted into different instruction set for each machine, preventing an attacker from recognizing any generated virtual opcode after the transformation from x86 instructions.
This post describes DeCV — a decompiler for Code Virtualizer.
This is the second part of Leaking information using timing attacks on hash tables, discussing implementation details of the leak. Read the first part for a high level overview.
Timing attacks  are an important subclass of side channel attacks used to reveal cryptographic secrets, basing only on time needed by targeted devices or applications to perform specific computations.
It turns out these attacks can be applied in a more prosaic context — instead of encryption keys, they can help us leak pointers to objects on the heap or, if we are lucky, in .code/.data sections of targeted application. Leaking a pointer with fixed RVA reveals the imagebase, so ASLR becomes ineffective (ROP). Leaking a heap pointer makes expoitation of WRITE-ANYWHERE bugs easier, so in both cases it’s a win.
This post provides a high-level description of a POC implementation of a timing attack on hashtable used in Firefox (tested on v4, v13, v14). POC is quite fast (takes few secs) and leaks a heap pointer to a JS object. A detailed explanation will be provided in a different post (part 2).